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CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY AND THE COOPERATIVE SOLUTION
Leah Barteld*

Abstract
Cross-border bankruptcy continues to be an important topic within
bankruptcy regimes worldwide. As more corporations find themselves
interacting in a market without the confines of geographic borders,
countries need to adapt their regulatory schemes to be able to properly
handle an orderly liquidation or reorganization without an adverse
impact on the economy. This paper discusses the challenges of creating
an effective cross-border bankruptcy regime and proposes a solution for
increasing coordination among insolvency proceedings. As a result of
increasing cooperation among jurisdictions in light of the recent and
ongoing financial crisis, reform within the bankruptcy regimes around
the world is foreseeable.
INTRODUCTION
Global Consumer Products Inc., (GCP),1 has operations in the United
States, Germany, Brazil, India, and China. Suppliers and creditors are
spread globally in Australia, Russia, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
GCP’s customers rely on selling GCP products on the customers’ store
shelves across the globe. This corporation employs hundreds of
thousands of employees, many whose retirement depends on their stock
options. GCP is a mega-corporation, a company that personifies the
growing trend of globalization. The collapse of GCP would be
catastrophic to the world’s economy. What jurisdiction would be best
equipped to represent this globally diverse group of creditors? Better yet,
what jurisdiction would be able to manage an effective reorganization
that would satisfy creditors, but still protect an employee’s retirement?
Corporations like GCP highlight the challenges of cross-border
insolvency proceedings and the need for reform in current practices.
Views and approaches on bankruptcy have evolved over the years as
the world faces an increasingly globalized market where the effects of an
entity, like GCP, entering insolvency, travels beyond geographic borders.
Currently, international bankruptcy is a “complex area of the law, which
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is ‘underdeveloped and inconsistent at best.’”2 Recently, there has been
an increase in cross-border insolvency cases.3 With the globalization of
trade and “increasing international nature of business,” it is natural to see
a “similar increase in the number of business failures, and hence also
with the number of cross-border insolvency cases.”4 Although there is
still a diverse collection of bankruptcy regimes operating in the world
today, countries are responding to the globalization trend and working
toward collaboration and harmonization within bankruptcy systems.5 As
countries continue to respond to the recent financial crisis, this history of
collaboration is only likely to increase as they work together to address
concerns about businesses whose failures can be so deeply entangled in
our global marketplace and how insolvency regimes can be aligned.6
I. APPROACHES TO INSOLVENCY REGIMES
Most legal systems “provide a legal mechanism to address the
collective satisfaction of the outstanding claims from assets” (whether
intangible or tangible) of the debtor if the debtor is “unable to pay its
debts and other liabilities as they become due.”7 There are a number of
mechanisms for resolving a debtor’s financial difficulties: voluntary
restructuring negotiations, 8 insolvency proceedings, 9 and administrative
processes.10 Insolvency proceedings can result in either reorganization or
liquidation.11 Although the days of debtor’s prison and torturing a debtor
are behind us with only a few exceptions, 12 insolvency regimes still
2
Mike Perry, Note, Lining-Up at the Border: Renewing the Call for a Canada—U.S.
Insolvency Convention in the 21st Century, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 469, 473 (2000).
3
PAUL L. C. TORREMANS, CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCIES IN EU, ENGLISH AND BELGIAN LAW
218 (K.J.M. Mortelmans ed., 2002).
4
See id.
5
Joseph Bellissimo, Proposed Insolvency Legislation Fosters Cross-Border Cooperation, THE
LAWYER’S WEEKLY CANADA (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=
article&articleid=529.
6
Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care for Secured Creditors’ Rights
in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 513, 514. “Cross-border insolvencies are not a
new phenomenon. However, it was only relatively recently that great strides have been made toward
more coordinated and efficient cross-border bankruptcies.” Id. at 514.
7
U. N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, at 9, U.N.
Sales No. E.05.V10 (2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE].
8
Voluntary restructuring negotiations are “generally limited to cases of corporate financial
difficulty or insolvency in which there is a significant amount of debt owed to banks and financiers.”
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 21. Voluntary restructuring negotiations were developed by
the bank sector and “[l]ed and influenced by internationally active banks and financiers.” Id.
9
See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 26.
10
See generally LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 21–29.
11
See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 26.
12
In early Roman agrarian society, if a debtor failed to pay his creditor, the debtor could be
taken captive by his creditor, and if the debts were unpaid for a “further sixty days, the creditor was
entitled to either put the debtor to death or sell him into slavery across the Tiber River.” Bob
Wessels, Bruce A. Markell & Jason J. Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Matters 3, (2009) [Hereinafter Wessels et al.]. Interestingly enough, recent talks in U.S.
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differ from country to country. If GCP, for example, found itself facing
insolvency across its global operations, it would face a variety of, and at
times conflicting, insolvency regimes. 13 Further, if GCP wanted to
reorganize, the laws of some jurisdictions in which they operate may not
be favorable toward reorganization.14 Beyond differing philosophies on
the goals of insolvency, a “dizzying array” of differences and
disagreements exist between jurisdictions with respect to procedures and
rules within a bankruptcy case, from the way creditors are required to file
and substantiate a claim to avoidance of pre-insolvency transactions
creating a hectic insolvency proceeding for GCP.15 These differences as
discussed below can have an impact ranging from a minor inefficiency or
individual inconvenience to producing vastly different outcomes for
certain creditors depending on how a jurisdiction’s rules apply to their
claim.16 With GCP operating in so many jurisdictions that apply different
rules to creditors, it could increase their overall cost of doing business if
creditors require more security to protect themselves should GCP
dissolve in a jurisdiction unfavorable to that creditor.
Broadly speaking, while insolvency regimes and doctrines can differ
in both their philosophies and effects on other jurisdictions,17 insolvency
regimes are generally divided into two categories: territoriality and
universality. 18 Neither “pure universalism nor pure territorialism” is
practical; however, hybrid systems have emerged to create “modified
universalism” and “cooperative territorialism.”19 Each type of insolvency
regime has benefits and drawbacks in approaching and managing crossborder insolvency.
A. Territoriality
If GCP became insolvent in a territoriality insolvency regime, 20 it
would file a case in each separate country, and each country would
media suggest the return of a debtor’s prison of sort with “collection agencies taking advantage of
archaic state laws to have some debtors arrested and sent to jail.” Henry Blodget, The Return of
Debtor’s Prisons: Collection Agencies Now Want Deadbeats Arrested, YAHOO! FINANCE, (Nov. 22,
2011, 12:24 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/return-debtors-prisons-collectionagencies-now-want-deadbeats-172417607.html.
13
See infra Part I. A. and I. B. for more information on common insolvency regimes.
14
Outside of the United States and Canada, bankruptcies were typically not conducted with the
goal of reorganization until more recently. Instead, most countries freeze debt until funding can be
found or assets sold. More Countries Adopt Similar Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Managing Credit
Receivables & Collections (Institute for Management & Administration), (Oct. 2002).
15
See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 17–23.
16
See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 17.
17
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517.
18
See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 40. (“Whether in trade in goods and services,
enforcement of judgments or intellectual property rights, or even pursuit of those suspected of
committing crimes, the overarching key question consistently boils down to the proper balance of
the competing interests of local protection versus international cooperation.”).
19
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518.
20
A past example was the 1992 insolvency law in Japan. Rosalind Mason, Cross-Border
Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law and Insolvency Law Meet, in International
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consider the proceeding its own main case.21 The territoriality regime is
best described as the “Grab Rule,” a concept built on the ground that
“local creditors had legitimate expectations that any financial crisis
would be resolved applying local policies and principles.” 22 A core
principle of this approach to insolvency demonstrates the belief that
“insolvency laws do not, of themselves, have an extraterritorial reach,
dealing as they must with the application of a given country’s rules to a
collection of property within the jurisdictional reach of that country.”23
The benefit of a territoriality regime is that in some situations,
resolution is more cost effective in protecting local creditors’ rights.
Local creditors can set realistic expectations for resolution of the case,
since “property is administered and distributed in each bankruptcy case
according to the local law in which [the] property resides.”24 Conversely,
the effects of the bankruptcy proceeding are limited to property that is
located within that jurisdiction.25 If a debtor maintained a bulk of their
assets in a jurisdiction different from where it incurred most of its debt,
the limitation of jurisdiction may work to the debtor’s benefit at the
detriment of the creditor in that the latter would not be able to reach
those assets.26 To counteract this problem, when local creditors make a
decision to contract with a debtor, they can protect themselves by relying
only on the security provided by local assets.27
A territorialism approach was unchallenged until relatively recently
when, “business began commonly to break past the constraints of
national boundaries to establish both asset bases and networks of

Insolvency Law: themes and perspectives, 27, 43 & n.95. (Paul J. Omar ed., 2008). For a discussion
of Japan’s ongoing substantive preference for territoriality under new Japanese bankruptcy law, see
Alexander M. Kipnis, Beyond UNICTRAL: Alternatives to Universality in Transnational Insolvency,
36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 156 (2006), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/djilp/36No2/BeyondUNCITRAL-Alternatives-Universatality-Transactional-Insolvency-Alexander-M-Kipnis.pdf.
However, bankruptcy law in Japan with the passage of the Civil Rehabilitation Law is highly
influenced by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, so perhaps some of the territorialist aspect will be softened
by the U.S. influence. Peng Xu, Bankruptcy Resolution in Japan: Civil Rehabilitation vs. Corporate
Reorganization, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-010 (Feb. 2004), http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/
publications/summary/04020008.html.
21
This type of doctrine, therefore, leaves open the possibility that there could be a “plurality of
proceedings” with the “exact number and jurisdictional location to be determined by the
circumstances” in the case. For more information on the territoriality insolvency regime, see Clark &
Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517.
22
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 841 (6th ed. 2009).
23
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518.
24
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518.
25
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518.
26
See Jacquie McNish, It’s the Law of the Jungle for Creditors: Bankruptcy Proceedings Are
Seeing Debt-Holders Launch Some Audacious Cross-Border Plays for Assets, GLOBE AND MAIL,
Jan. 21, 2009, at B9. Parents sometimes use subsidiaries as banks of last resort for restructurings and
as a result shuffle around assets that could later hurt the creditors’ rights to those assets in an
insolvency proceeding whose jurisdiction is limited. See id.
27
See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 7.
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creditors and claims that span many sovereign territories.” 28 This
unsatisfactory resolution regime for transnational companies has been
partly addressed by alternative theories within territoriality (e.g., the
theory of “cooperative territorialism” proposed by Professor LoPucki
with principals of cooperation and mutual administration).29
B. Universality
If GCP filed an insolvency case in a jurisdiction with a universality
insolvency regime, it would face a very different result. Universality
regimes focus on the fact that bankruptcy is a collective proceeding that
“must extend to all the debtor’s assets and stakeholders,” and a resolution
must therefore be “symmetric to a debtor’s market.”30 The focal point of
this holistic approach is that “for every debtor there should be a unified
process of administration with all claims and interest channeled through
one main proceeding.”31 In a case brought under a universality doctrine
in the debtor’s domicile country, all of the debtor’s property, regardless
of its location, is brought to the home jurisdiction for resolution, and
creditors must bring their claims in that jurisdiction. 32 If GCP’s home
jurisdiction for purposes of insolvency was considered the United States,
for example, all of the corporation’s property, whether in India, China, or
elsewhere, theoretically, would be brought into the United States’
jurisdiction for claim resolution purposes. Universality can sometimes be
compared to ordinary bankruptcy proceeding found in the United States,
and is considered to be more in “conformity with the very nature of
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings” 33 in addition to being more
economical, faster, and more efficient. 34
But while a universality regime has the benefit of a belief that
“expects that the effects—on both the property and the interests of the

28

See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 41.
For more information on “cooperative territorialism,” see Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6.
“The five areas LoPucki suggests ought be the subject of cooperation: (1) the establishment of
procedures for replicating claims filed [in a bankruptcy proceeding] in any one country in all of
them; (2) the sharing of distribution lists by representatives to ensure that later distributions do not
go to creditors who have already recovered the full amounts owed to them; (3) the joint sale of
assets, when a joint sale would produce a higher price than separated sales in multiple countries or
when the value of assets within a country is not sufficiently large to warrant separated
administration; (4) the voluntary investment by representatives in one county in the debtor’s
reorganization in another; and (5) the seizure and return of assets that have been the subject of
avoidable transfers.” See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 520 & n.50.
30
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at 841.
31
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517.
32
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 516.
33
See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 4. “This argument is based on two assumptions. One is
that in nature bankruptcy and insolvency proceeding are a form of collective liquidation and
distribution of the assets of the debtor. The second one is that the assets can be seen as a single entity
that is linked to the person of the debtor.” See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 5.
34
See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 5.
29
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debtor—will be worldwide,” there are a number of drawbacks. 35 Even
though universality eliminates “discussion concerning the issue of which
asset should go in which national territorial bankruptcy,” there are still
contested issues regarding the location of intangible assets and whether
the jurisdiction in which the asset is located is willing to give up
applying local law to the distribution of said asset.36 Recognizing these
drawbacks, an alternative theory of modified universality has developed
and is considered the best balance between pure universality and
territoriality regimes.37
Since pure universality is unrealistic,38 “modified universality begins
with the idea of pure universalism, and then moves toward the center of
the spectrum by incorporating certain territorialism tendencies.” 39 This
type of doctrine tries to address the problem of a debtor that could easily
choose a forum based on the laws that will be applied, thus engaging in
“forum shopping.” 40 If GCP, for example, went to file its insolvency
case, it might select a forum that had more protections for debtors at the
expense of creditor’s rights.41 At a theoretical level, scholars would argue
that a universal system, even modified universality, is far superior to
territorialism because the approach is “market symmetrical,” and a global
market requires a global bankruptcy law that provides “a single
proceeding that can apply rules and reach results that are conclusive with
respect to all stakeholders through the global market.”42
One drawback is the protection of the creditors’ rights is not as certain as within a
territoriality jurisdiction. Because the home country’s laws in the debtor’s home country are applied,
expectations of creditors may be defeated by differing rules of distribution and priority.
Additionally, there can be a considerable cost with consolidating all of the debtor’s assets and
creditor’s claims in one court, especially in the case of “far-flung assets” that may have been better
addressed in the jurisdiction of their physical location. Finally, there can be a challenge in funneling
the assets of an entity into a home country’s jurisdiction and control if there is a not a treaty or
agreement in place that would increase the likelihood that a country would let property “located in
their jurisdiction be administered under anything other than local law.” See generally Clark &
Goldstein, supra note 6, at 517–518.
36
See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 5–6.
37
The compromise between universality in bankruptcy law and national sovereignty inherent
in the concept of modified universality recently provided the basis for the conclusion of an
international bankruptcy concordat instructive to Canada and the United States. Perry, supra note 2,
at 478.
38
See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 49. “In its purest form, universalism would mean that
one worldwide court (or system of courts operating under one administrative umbrella) would apply
one set of insolvency laws to all international insolvency cases.” See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at
49.
39
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at n.34.
40
“Effective co-ordination measures should eliminate any potential incentive for parties in
financial difficulties to engage in forum shopping by transferring assets to those Member-States [in
the E.U.] that are perceived to have a more favorable protective regime.” See TORREMANS, supra
note 3, at 139.
41
For a discussion on jurisdictions with a high degree of creditor orientation and a ranking of
creditor-debtor orientation by selected countries see Armin J. Kammel, The Law and Economics of
Corporate Insolvency – Some Thoughts, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW: THEMES &
PERSPECTIVES 65-66 (Paul Omar ed., 2008).
42
See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 49.
35
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In a modified universalism system, the lead court in administering the
case is the company’s “‘home country,” which is typically determined by
the “center of its main interest” or “COMI.” 43 For example, if an
insolvent corporation’s “home country” is the United States, U.S. courts
would assert worldwide jurisdiction over the assets of the debtor.44 With
the choice of forum addressed, the question of choice of law can often be
a distinct issue, although related to which country is the “home country.”
In any cross-border bankruptcy case, the court will be required to choose
which bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law to apply. With this
knowledge in hand, debtors can be incentivized to file in a country that
favors the debtor’s needs, or avoid a “priority that would otherwise be
enjoyed by a particular creditor constituency in another country where
some assets or operations were located.”45 Therefore, these choices in a
universalism system can be determinative of the resolution of the
insolvency case for a multinational corporation.
This concern is partially addressed by modified universality46 because
it recognizes the downside of a system where a “debtor can easily choose
a substantive law that will govern their insolvency and that is contrary to
the expectations and interests of creditors.”47 This theory has emerged as
the dominant theory of insolvency regime. However, some of the benefit
of a universalist system where assets and claims are consolidated is lost
within the modified universalism regime. Modified universality allows
an ancillary court to “retain their right to protect local creditors;”
therefore, some of the predictability of knowing in advance the debtor’s
home country and laws that will be applied is lost.48 Many of the more
modern bankruptcy regimes are reforming to align to a modified
universality structure. Despite differences in insolvency regimes around
the world, there is a history of cooperation between jurisdictions for the
purposes of managing cross-border insolvency cases and the
reorganization or liquidation of multinational businesses.
II. HISTORY OF COOPERATION
To address the growing number of cross-border insolvencies,
practitioners, judges, and legislators have “craft[ed] gap-filling solutions
to bring order to the chaos of uncoordinated cross-border insolvency
43

See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at 843.
There are some challenges to this assertion if the United States cannot find a way to assert
personal jurisdiction over the entity. “Two grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with
due process are asserted here: (i) transnational jurisdiction as set forth in 1 Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws §47(1)(1971) and (ii) general ‘doing business’ jurisdiction as set forth in §47(2) of
the Restatement.” In re McLean Industries, Inc, 68 B.R. 690, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
45
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 515.
46
The United States adopted a modified universality regime with the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code.
47
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 519 & n.35.
48
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 519.
44
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cases” with creativity and dedication.49 Some countries have successfully
reached agreements to cooperate in cross-border insolvency cases, at
least regionally if not globally. 50 The importance of harmonized
insolvency legislation is that it provides a “higher degree of certainty and
reciprocity for the players.”51 Jurisdictions recognize that there is value
and efficiency in an insolvency proceeding in mainly one jurisdiction,
where one court primarily, although not necessarily exclusively, can
control the assets of the restructuring and coordinate the treatment of
creditors.52 However, historically, many of these efforts at cross-border
cooperation were either very regionalized, or did not achieve widespread
adoption.
A. Treaties
One of the first efforts that countries used to establish cooperative
efforts for insolvency proceedings that spanned geographic borders was
the use of treaties. Treaties have the advantage of being the “local law”
in “all jurisdictions in which the treaty is adopted.”53 While the power of
a treaty can be helpful, it can also be quite limited if the number of
signatories to the treaty is small, since the treaty is only effective in the
countries that have signed it. As a result, using treaties proved to be an
unsuccessful method for coordinating insolvency proceedings across
several countries.
B. Comity
Comity is used by countries to recognize foreign bankruptcy
proceedings. Both Canada and the United States have used this principle
to recognize proceedings of companies that are highly interconnected
between the two neighbors. Under Comity, “the extent that the United
States and foreign bankruptcy laws are inconsistent is important in
determination of whether a foreign court’s decrees should be enforced in
the United States.”54 U.S. courts deferred to the laws and judicial acts of
the United Kingdom in Maxwell Communication, after determining that
the “basic notions of due process and fair treatment of U.S. creditors
were present.”55 The U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to address
49

See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at xiii.
There have been formal bankruptcies treaties and attempts at formal bankruptcy treaties
dating back almost eight hundred years. Perry, supra note 2, at 478.
51
See Bellissimo, supra note5.
52
See Bellissimo, supra note 5.
53
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 13.02 (16th ed. 2009).
54
Mark G. Douglas & Nicholas C. Kamphaus. Cross-Bankruptcy Battleground: The
Importance of Comity (Part II). (May/June 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/cross-borderbankruptcy-battleground-the-importance-of-comity-part-ii-05-31-2010/.
55
Anne Nielson, Mike Sigal & Karen Wagner, The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat:
Principles to Facilities the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 533 (1996)
[hereinafter Nielson et al.]. The Maxwell communications business empire collapsed in the early
1990s, leaving some 400 subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries spread all over the world. The business
50
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Comity in Hilton v. Guyot, and defined it as “the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under protection of its laws.”56 Canada also used principles of
Comity to recognize proceedings that spanned the United StatesCanadian border, because of their frequent economic interaction.
Comity was later codified in U.S. law. Section 304 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code was designed to “only permit the opening of an
ancillary case” and did not address the coordination of “full-blown
proceedings pending both in the United States and another country” and
was a “dramatic turn away from a history of territorialism.”57 Case law
developed under this section is still relevant, but the section was later
repealed by the passage of the new chapter 15 in 2005.58
C. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings
Although the European Union’s member states have been “striving
for harmony in the area of bankruptcy law for more than forty years” 59
with little success, real progress was made when the European Union
developed its most widely adopted pan-European rules governing
insolvency proceedings. The European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings (Insolvency Convention) was passed on September 25,
1995,60 with final adoption on May 29, 2000.61 In order to promote the
free flow of commerce and creation of a single market within the
European Economic Community, the leaders recognized the need to deal
with insolvency and bankruptcy.62 The agreement incorporated a number
of elements of a modified universality approach, as discussed above. The
Explanatory Report to the Insolvency Convention read:
[The] Convention seeks to reconcile the principle of
universality and the protection of local interest and also
underwent bankruptcy proceedings under English and U.S. law. The joint agreement order in the
MCC case represents a practical approach, taking a worldwide perspective to implementing an
equitable solution to avoiding conflicts in a potentially very complicated cross-border reorganization
situation. See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 69.
56
159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895) (holding that the U.S. court should enforce the judgment and that
the issue should not be “tried afresh” if a foreign forum provides a full and fair trial abroad before a
court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation and
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting).
57
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 523.
58
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 13.02 (16th ed. 2009).
59
See Perry, supra note 2, at 483.
60
See Nielson et al., supra note 55.
61
See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 133.
62
See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 133.
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the principles of the respective legal systems . . . permits
local proceedings governed by their own lex fori
concurus (law applicable in the place of insolvency) to
coexist with the main universal proceeding. Single
universal proceedings are always possible within the EC,
but the Convention does not exclude the opening of local
proceedings, controlled and governed by its rules, to
protect those local interests.63
More recently, in 2007, the European Communication and
Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency (Insolvency
Guidelines) were published.64 The Insolvency Guidelines are helpful for
understanding some of the cumbersome procedures found in the
Insolvency Convention. 65 The document highlights the role of a
practitioner in ensuring that coordination between proceedings take place
through a duty to communicate information and cooperate. 66 Although
the Insolvency Guidelines are not binding, they assist in setting standards
for knowledge and professional behavior that are key to achieving the
goals of the EC Insolvency Regulation.67 The purpose of the Insolvency
Guidelines was to introduce rules for “dealing with insolvencies with a
cross-border element,” but its effectiveness in practice has been
hampered by the Regulation’s restrictions on application to qualified
proceedings. 68 However, even with procedures in place for managing
insolvencies within the European Union’s borders, there are still
challenges for forum shopping and companies jockeying among
jurisdictions to file in the most favorable for their needs and purposes.
D. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat
In the spring of 1996, the International Bar Association approved the
“Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat.” 69 The Concordat acted as an
interim step until “treaties and/or statutes were adopted by commercial
nations,” and set forth ten general principles. Like the Insolvency
63

Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings, (May 3, 1996), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/952/1/insolvency_report_schmidt_1988.pdf. “The absence of a Convention on
insolvency proceedings with the framework of the Community is viewed as a short-coming in the
completion of the internal market.” Id.
64
Bob Wessels, European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border
Insolvency: Also of Interest for North-American Practitioners and Judges, International Committee,
4 ABI Committee News (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter Wessels].
65
See Wessells, supra note 64.
66
See Wessells, supra note 64.
67
See Wessells, supra note 64.
68
TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 140. The scope of the Regulation has been restricted in three
ways: (1) the Regulation deals with insolvency procedures, and sets forth the requirements that need
to be met before a procedure becomes an insolvency procedure, (2) certain types of companies are
excluded from the scope of the Regulation and (3) the Regulation is restricted to the European
Union. TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 140, 144.
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Proceedings, the Concordat employed a modified universality theory and
was designed to assist courts and counsels in “harmonizing cross-border
insolvencies.”70 The passage of the Concordat signaled recognition of the
difficulty, given strong national interests, in the “preservation of
sovereignty and the absence of treaties in creating truly unified
proceedings.” 71 The structure of the Concordat resulted in a “central
administrative forum located in one country, supplemented by ancillary,
or secondary, proceedings located in other countries.” 72 Cases resolved
with the help of the Concordat include In re Everfresh Beverages73 and
In re Joseph Nakash.74
E. ALI Transnational Insolvency Project
The Insolvency Convention set the stage for further regional
cooperation. The ALI Transnational Insolvency Project (ALI Project)
was developed in 2001 by the American Law Institute. 75 It set out to
propose “more specific procedures by which such cooperation—
especially coordination of parallel proceedings—might be effectuated.”76
The ALI principles were established based on the “perceived need for a
private-sector initiative.” The objective of the ALI Project was limited to
developing “cooperative procedures for use in business insolvency cases
involving companies with assets or creditors in more than one of the
three NAFTA countries.” 77 The proposed principles of cooperation
include seventeen guidelines that were developed from the lessons
learned during more than a dozen cross-border cases where courts
aligned their approaches, communication, supervision and completion of
a cross-border insolvency case. 78 The project took an interesting
70

Nielson et al., supra note 55.
Nielson et al., supra note 55.
72
Nielson et al., supra note 55.
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The case of In re Everfresh Beverages involved a bankrupt U.S. corporation with operations
in both the United States and Canada that filed proceedings in both the US and Canada. During the
proceedings, both the Ontario Court of Justice and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York issued orders approving a stipulation of cross-border insolvency
protocol to govern the bankrupt’s provision. The stipulation was consistent with—and almost
identical to—many of the provisions of the Concordat. Perry, supra note 2, at 486.
74
In Nakash, the debtor had diversified business interests throughout the world….[and] filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and
managed his affairs as debtor and debtor-in-possession. The defendant was a member of the board of
directors of the North American Bank, Ltd., an Israeli banking institution which was declared
insolvent and a Receiver was appointed. The case concerned jurisdiction and the extraterritoriality
application of an automatic stay—with the court holding that participation in the U.S. Chapter 11
case gave the bankruptcy court jurisdiction and found the actions of the Israeli Receiver a violation
of the automatic stay. See Nakash v. Zur (In re Joseph Nakash), 190 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996).
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See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 247.
76
See Wessels et al., supra note 2, at 104.
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Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The Ali
Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (Winter, 2002).
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See id. at 247.
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approach to develop procedures by first taking the time to get to “know
each other’s laws,” to report on their findings to all of the stakeholders,
and to use that knowledge to be able to know how to coordinate those
proceedings. 79 Adoption of amended national bankruptcy regimes
supports the implementation of the principles proposed to increase
commercial predictability within the NAFTA region.80
F. Other Regional Efforts
The importance of regional collaboration is best illustrated by the
result when coordination is absent. When the conglomerate Asia Pulp
and Paper collapsed in 2001, there were no regional cross-border
insolvency laws in place at the time.81 As a result, the company fell with
debts of $13.9 billion and its creditors were left with no alternative but a
“hard fought informal restructuring of the group.”82 Responding to the
chaotic restructuring, the Asian Development Bank launched a program
focused on insolvency law reform in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand. 83 In addition to the regional arrangements now in
existence in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Northern Europe, and
Central Africa have structures in place for some form of cooperation.84
G. UNCITRAL
The most successful example to date of widespread cooperation of
local courts cooperating within international insolvency cases is the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law
adopted in 1997.85 The law was introduced to try to address some of the
gaps left behind by regionalized agreements.86 Commonly referred to as
“UNCITRAL Model Law” or just “Model Law,”87 it is the basis for a
number of local laws concerning cross-border bankruptcy, including
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.88 The law was formulated to
deal with the “rapidly expanding volume of international insolvency
cases.” 89 The law is an endorsement of cooperation among courts and
79

See id. at 104.
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Richard Fisher & Michael Sloan, Why Asia Needs a Regional Insolvency Pact: A Regional
Treaty on Cross-Border Insolvency Would Promote Foreign Investment. 23 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 3
Mar. 2004.
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Id.
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See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 163.
84
See generally Wessels et al., supra note 12, 154–162.
85
About UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
86
See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 199.
87
Here, the author uses “Model Law,” but the terms can be used interchangeably.
88
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is very similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Brad B. Erens & Michael G. Douglas, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Denies Failed Hedge Fund’s Request
for Chapter 15 Recognition, Mondaq Ltd., (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
article.asp?articleid=53060.
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1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 13.02 (16th ed. 2009).
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encourages such cooperation by any means permitted within local law.90
To date, the Model Law has been enacted in eighteen nations or
territories, still far short of widespread adoption.91 The Model Law does
not “envisage a full-scale harmonization of national insolvency laws,”
but “comes in addition to the substantive insolvency laws of the states
that will implement it, and it aims to deal with the special difficulties that
are associated with a number of cross-border insolvency situations.” 92
Other treaties and agreements in existence between countries still
provide the basis for most cooperative efforts within a cross-border
bankruptcy case. The Model Law, while providing the basis for domestic
laws, addresses some important issues in international insolvency only
indirectly and leaves unanswered questions on choice of law.93 Without
the weight of widespread adoption, the Model Law still lacks credibility
in many jurisdictions.
H. Notable Cases
The importance of attempting to mitigate the conflicts in national
insolvency regimes when resolving a company with international
corporate structure was learned through the complicated resolution of the
Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Founded in 1972
in Luxembourg, BCCI had more than 400 offices in sixty-nine countries
and collapsed after years of investigation revealed in 1991 that financial
statements have been falsified since the bank’s founding. 94 The
challenges identified that complicated the liquidation of BCCI’s assets
and reduced the amount that could be distributed to creditors included
differing insolvency regimes for banks and branches, 95 different
liquidation procedures,96 the right of set-off differing across regimes, 97
and the potential for criminal charges to be brought to prevent fraud in
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See TORREMANS, supra note 3, at 200.
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See Mason, supra note 20, at 58.
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Richard J. Herring, BCCI & Barings: Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and Global
Corporate Structure 5, 2004 (paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference
on Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies, Sept. 30–Oct. 1) available at
http://www.iadi.org/Business%20Plans/Cross_Border_Barings_BCCI_Paper.pdf.
95
For example, the United States follows a “separate-entity doctrine in which the agency or
branch of a foreign bank is treated as if [it] were a separately incorporated legal entity for purposes
of liquidation” and some countries, like Luxembourg and the UK follow a “single-entity doctrine.”
In this doctrine, “foreign branches are treated as offices of a single corporate entity.” Herring, supra
note 94, at 11.
96
In the United States, bankruptcy law does not apply to banks. Instead, the “primary bank
supervisor would liquidate the branch of a foreign bank.” Conversely, some foreign courts apply to
the same liquidation laws to banks as to other commercial entities, or decide on a case-by-case basis.
Herring, supra note 94, at 13.
97
Set off is defined as “a nonjudicial process whereby mutual claims between parties, such as a
loan or deposit, are extinguished.” Herring, supra note 94, at 21 (citations omitted).
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bankruptcy proceedings. 98 The two approaches to insolvency regimes
have different implications for market discipline and may “undermine
incentives for creditors with international operations to seek to do
transactions in well-supervised jurisdictions.”99 With a lack of agreement
on an international insolvency regime, uninsured creditors of BCCI
incurred substantial legal expenses and a long wait for settlement of their
claims.100
I. Case-Level Protocols
Sometimes coordination can be achieved through case specific
agreements for those cross-border bankruptcy cases that involve a
particularly large pool of creditors spread across multiple jurisdictions. In
In re Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., jurisdictions involved in the
resolution of the company developed a cross-border insolvency protocol
that supported the coordination of foreign proceedings. 101 Under the
protocol, “the administrators and trustees would have a streamlined
method for administering intercompany claims, including the creation of
a committee to discuss methods to resolve those claims” and create a
framework to minimize the cost and maximize the recoveries to
Lehman’s creditors. 102 The document lists seven goals, including
coordination, communication, information and data sharing, asset
preservation, claims reconciliation, the maximization of recoveries, and
Comity. 103 Administrators and trustees in Germany, Australia, Hong
Kong, Singapore, the Netherlands, and the United States have signed the
Lehman Protocol.104 Case-level protocols are not without complications,
as a case-level protocol does not “address the inherent complexities
caused by state’s differing insolvency and private international laws” and
can therefore be difficult to enforce.105 A case-level protocol is seen as
more of an economic solution than a legal approach and fails to provide

98

In jurisdictions where criminal charges can be levied against a bank, even when it has
entered insolvency (like in the United States), these ancillary charges could actually work to
“override ex ante repayment priorities and reduce the amounts available for distribution to
creditors.” Herring, supra note 94, at 15. Some of these challenges are unique to bank insolvency
proceedings and do not apply to corporate entities in bankruptcy.
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See generally Herring, supra note 94.
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See Herring, supra note 94, at 18.
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http://www.law360.com/articles/107073 (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
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See id.
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ability to share certain nonpublic information—including the debtors' books, records,
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Additionally, the agreement provides a mechanism for administrators to adjust distributions so that,
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40

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 9

the predictability that would help stabilize the market and decrease risk
when initially contracting with a debtor.106
III. CHALLENGES TO COOPERATION
Despite movements to create more harmonized insolvency
proceedings, many barriers still exist to full cooperation of jurisdictions
in managing cross-border bankruptcy cases. Cultural and legal
differences between jurisdictions can create friction in the coordination
of resolution efforts. Even if jurisdictions are able to agree on deferring
to a primary foreign proceeding, procedural challenges do not end there.
If the agreement is to place a primary insolvency proceeding in the
company’s “Center of Main Interests,” how does a jurisdiction determine
the COMI? This can be a contentious point in an insolvency proceeding
even with existing cross-border cooperation agreements in place.107 For
example, GCP has operations in the United States, Germany, Brazil,
India, and China. If its executives and management responsibilities are
spread evenly among those jurisdictions, how could the COMI be
determined satisfactorily? In the United States, a main proceeding is
defined by “a case pending in whatever country contains the debtor’s
‘center of main interests.’” 108 In order to interpret this statutory
definition, the courts in the United States are expressly directed to look
for guidance in the “interpretation of COMI by foreign jurisdictions
under similar statutes.” 109 The E.U. Insolvency Convention defines
“COMI” as the “place where the debtor conducts administration of his
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third
parties.”110 Courts in the United States have adopted the E.U. Convention
standard of looking to objective and ascertainable factors to rebut the
presumption that the jurisdiction of the registered office is the COMI of a
debtor. 111 Despite agreement between the European Union and the
United States on the determination of COMI, this remains a vague
106

See Mason, supra note 20, at 36, (citation omitted).
Keith J. Shapiro et al., America Now! What’s New on the Other Side of the Pond?, 4 ABI
Committee News (Nov. 2007).
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11 U.S.C. §1502(4) (2011). In applying this test, however, the United States has denied the
recognition of an insolvency proceedings based on the determination that the proceeding was not
taking place in the entity’s COMI. “Because the foreign proceedings are not pending in a country
where the funds have their COMI or where that have an establishment, the proceedings are not
eligible for relief as main or non-main proceedings under chapter 15.” In re Bear Stearns High-Grace
Structured Credito Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
109
See Erens & Douglas, supra note 88.
110
See Erens & Douglas, supra note 88. This definition is very similar to the concept of
“principal place of business” in U.S. law. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181(2010)(holding that
“principal place of business” refers to the place where the corporation's high level officers direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities. Lower federal courts have often metaphorically
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111
In Re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
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definition when applied to a corporation that is truly global in its
operations, like GCP. Further, although there is harmonization between
the United States and the European Union in defining COMI, a critical
term, for purposes of recognizing proceedings, other definitions and tests
exist. A debtor that has assets and conducts business in more than one
country could find itself “satisfying the requirements to be subject to the
insolvency laws of more than one State because of the different tests of
debtor eligibility or different interpretations of the same test.” 112
Countries may be unwilling to coordinate with another foreign
proceeding if procedures and due process are not compatible.
Cultural attitudes also play a large role in the effectiveness of a
national bankruptcy system, including approaches to debt forgiveness
and the “way people stand in life.”113 Different cultures hold different
legal beliefs and values, and those values shape a domestic insolvency
regime, including how it treats debtors. As mentioned earlier, debtor’s
prisons still exist in some parts of the world. Further, a bankruptcy
regime does not live in isolation, but is under the “influence of a
particular nation’s overall legal system, where case law or code based”114
and the economic and financial structure of the domestic market. There
exists a “close relationship between economic results and legal
solutions” and insolvency law “underpins the commercial and financial
dealings in the market economy” and the “choices it makes are a crucial
indicator of the attitudes and fundamental values of the state’s legal
system.”115 There is a strong probability that a government will seek an
insolvency regime that protects local creditors and stakeholders. This is
not a surprising result, because the government “faces public and policy
pressure to allocate financial resources in a way that reduces the burden
for its own taxpayers.”116
With all of these different factors affecting a country’s national
bankruptcy system, there is the opportunity for great friction between
two nation’s insolvency regimes. 117 Any friction between the two
countries in their cooperative efforts could be further burdened by the
political overlay.118 These interacting factors can make it challenging for
112
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See Mason, supra note 20, at 8.
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Aldo Caliari, Transatlantic Cooperation for Post-Crisis Financial Reform: To What End?,
CTR. OF CONCERN 16 (Apr. 2011), https://www.coc.org/files/PostCrisisRef.pdf.
117
Aside from political tensions, differences between two jurisdictions can also present
challenges when sharing information or transferring assets. For instance, China has very strong
“state secrets” law and may block the exchange of some information if it has deemed that
information to qualify as a “state secret,” a definition that is inherently broad. The potential “that
economic and business data may be considered state secrets according to such sweeping
interpretations has alarming consequences for U.S. companies collecting business data in China.”
Edward Epstein, When State Secrets Are Not Secret, INSIGHT, Oct. 2010, http://www.amchamshanghai.org/amchamportal/InfoVault_Library/2010/When_State_Secrets_are_not_Secret.pdf.
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say the least. If a multinational corporation was attempting a resolution that was enforceable in both
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two countries to agree to collaborate on the resolution of an insolvency
proceeding when their national systems exist in such different contexts.
Cross-border insolvencies therefore “thrust these systems into sometimes
uneasy partnerships,” forcing them to choose between “finding some
means of cooperation and compromise or watching the destruction of
viable enterprises and asset value.”119 Even if the tension between two
jurisdictions can be managed, case-level challenges still exist.
Even with agreements in place, a lack of case-level coordination can
be crippling to the successful resolution of a cross-border bankruptcy
case. The liquidation of Allen Standford’s banks faced conflicting rulings
from Canadian and English Courts based on differing rulings on the
determination of the Foreign Main Proceeding (the United States and
Antigua, respectively). 120 In addition to struggles between Canada and
England, “the Antiguan liquidators and the United States receivership
were gearing up for fights over assets situated in other locations, such as
Switzerland.” 121 The lack of cooperation between jurisdictions
demonstrates some of the challenges still faced in developing effective
coordination efforts in the resolution of cross-border insolvency cases
even if over-arching agreements for cooperation are in existence.
IV. FUTURE OF COOPERATION
We are now entering into a time of historic levels of cooperation and
information sharing. 122 With widespread financial reform occurring
around the world in response to the financial crisis in 2008–2009,
changes in national bankruptcy systems could be a natural and necessary
side effect. Often a prerequisite for “effective economic integration”
between countries is a uniformity of bankruptcy laws, a concept
recognized in the United States since the drafting of The Federalist
Papers. 123 As national systems are amending to adapt to growing
globalization, some territorialist approaches could be relaxed amidst
reform efforts for more cooperative measures that would promote
of these jurisdictions, the political tension would make this almost impossible. For more on CubaUnited States relations see Background Note: Cuba, U.S. Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm, (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). Even more recently the
tensions between Iran have escalated, resulting in both the United States and E.U. announcing
coordinating sanctions. These are political contexts and complications that can plague any
coordination efforts between two jurisdictions. To read more about recent developments in IranWestern relations, see Iran, Country and Territory Reports, N. Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html (last updated Jan. 4, 2012).
119
See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 12.
120
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 521.
121
See Clark & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 521.
122
Quentin Peel, Keynote at International Bar Association 2009 Annual Conference (Oct. 4,
2009). “In the first place, we were living in unprecedented world of open borders, free movement of
capital and a lot of movement of people too. And the volume of the money that’s moving is of quite
unprecedented quantities.” Id.
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See Perry, supra note 2, at n.11.
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effective and efficient resolution of cross-border insolvency cases for
multinational corporations. While the task of a “formalized mutual
administration” that is “attentive to the distinct interests of the effective
administration of foreign-located assets and the maintenance of state
sovereignty” that are at odds in cross-border insolvency may be
daunting, there are signs of progress in the international conversation.124
Experts contend that the financial crisis that rippled through the world
in 2008–2009 was the worst shock to the global economy since the
1930’s.125 World leaders came together to stabilize the global economy
and met in 2009 at the U.N. Conference on the World Financial and
Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development to identify responses,
both emergency and long term. 126 As a result of increased
communication and cooperation, global leaders, through the efforts and
voice of the G-20, 127 have promoted an effort to coordinate global
policy.128
The international system, as constructed following the
Second World War, will be almost unrecognizable in
2025. Indeed, international system is a misnomer. It is
likely to be more ramshackle than orderly, its
composition hybrid and heterogeneous, as befits a
transition that will still be a work in progress . . . the
[t]ransformation is being fuelled by a globalizing
economy, marked by an historic shift of relative wealth
and economic power from West to East, and by the
increasing weight of new players especially China and
India. 129
Just recently, the G-20 again affirmed their commitment to advanced
cooperative measures to promote financial stability in the international
marketplace and work together to make “globalization serve the needs of
our people.” 130 The increased dialogue is highlighted by the growing
124
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2008), http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?article596.
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to the 1997 East Asian financial crisis in order to “ensure broader participation in discussions on
international financial affairs among countries whose size or strategic importance gives them a
particularly crucial role in the global economy.” Roy Culpeper, Systemic Reform at a Standstill: A
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number of venues for such transatlantic cooperation to develop. While
there has been cooperation among nations within criminal and human
rights law, 131 international coordination is just now growing in
international private law and its regulatory framework, providing a basis
for a bankruptcy reform conversation.
Other areas of growing global collaboration set the example for
increased information and resource sharing within the insolvency
context. For example, foreign institutions have measures in place to
cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of securities law
violations. “Because territory-based conflicts approaches parcel out
regulatory authority along geographical lines, it is evident that they are in
many respects ill-suited to resolve conflicts in a world of cross-border
activity.” 132 The International Organization of Securities Commissions
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (IOSCO MMOU),
developed in 2002 and endorsed by IOSCO in 2005,133 is the first global
information-sharing arrangement among securities regulators and sets a
new “international benchmark for cross-border cooperation critical to
combating violations of securities and derivatives laws.”134 The IOSCO
MMOU, signed by securities regulators from eighty-six countries with
thirty-four members listed in the Annex B List,135 recognizes the global
nature of transactions and the necessity of countries working together to
share information and assist in investigations to protect investors from a
crime that is rarely contained within a single jurisdiction. The IOSCO
MMOU increased interaction and cooperation between foreign securities
regulators. 136 Other initiatives have developed within jurisdictions to
make globalization serve the needs of our people.” Press Release, French Presidency of the G-20,
Building our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html.
131
For example, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime “aims to enable
different countries' law enforcement authorities to cooperate effectively in combating organized
crime by eliminating differences and different definitions of crimes among national legal systems, so
a crime in one country will be recognized as crime in other countries.” EC Ratification of UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, EUROPEAN UNION @ UNITED NATIONS (Sept.
1, 2003), http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2668_en.htm.
132
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INT'L L. 931, 976 (Summer 2002).
133
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background (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
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promote collaboration in the financial markets, like the efforts of the
Office of Financial Research in the United States, established within the
U.S. Treasury Department.137 Although securities fraud appears to be a
more egregious crime than a creditor being denied their rights to a
debtor’s assets because of jurisdictional limitations, the injuries to a
creditor can be just as severe to that of a defrauded investor.138 The fact
that countries are willing to work together to protect an investor provides
the groundwork for similar arrangements in sharing information and
resources to protect a creditor or debtor, regardless of the number of
jurisdictions involved.
Some of the more fundamental conflicts between insolvency laws
have seen some resolution as states converge around the “rescue
model.” 139 Although historically most insolvency systems have
approached insolvency with the end goal of liquidation, countries are
now “increasingly adopting and enhancing insolvency laws designed to
facilitate reorganization of faltering businesses rather than immediately
resorting to liquidation.” 140 This shift is notable when examining the
goals of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB “brings together
national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant
international financial centers, international financial institutions, sectorspecific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and
committees of central bank experts.” 141 Established to “address
vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory,
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supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability,”142 the
FSB is promoting a comprehensive policy framework “comprising a new
international standard for resolution regimes, more intensive and
effective supervision, and requirements for cross-border cooperation and
recovery and resolution planning.”143 A lot of this reform is in response
to the designation of Global Systemically Important Financial
Institutions (G-SIFIs) or institutions “too big to fail.”
G-SIFIs are defined by the FSB as “financial institutions whose
distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and
systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the
wider financial system and economic activity.” 144 In order to address
policy considerations for the resolutions of these mega firms, the FSB is
promoting legislative changes that will be required in many jurisdictions
to strengthen cooperation.145 Both the United States and European Union
have already adopted new regulations or amended legislation that
addresses the resolution of these global institutions. New regulations to
address the management of an orderly resolution of failing companies
that have a large presence in multiple jurisdictions is arguably the
strongest protection against another future public bailout. 146 In this
regard, the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States 147 creates an Orderly
Liquidation Authority 148 for systemically important firms, and the
European Union issued Directive on Credit Institutions Reorganization
and Winding-Up which addresses the resolution of a bank systemically
important to the European Union.149 However, “without an agreed crossborder regime, both European and U.S. companies will [still] be hard to
142
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unwind.” 150 Even with legislation in place to address systemically
important institutions, the legislation does not necessarily allow for
coordination if that institution has an equally strong and vital presence in
both the United States and European Union. The need for further
cooperation in developing cross-border resolution regimes is illustrated
by the difficulties in resolving large and complex cross-border
institutions. Those resolutions reveal the need for significant transatlantic
cooperation in order to ensure the credibility and viability of cross-border
bank and financial companies’ resolution regimes and avoidance of
bailouts.151
Other organizations have also addressed providing a framework for
the orderly resolution of “cross-border failures of large complex banking
organizations,” recognizing the necessity of change. The Basel
Committee’s152 Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group has developed ten
recommendations 153 for national authorities, which “aim at greater
convergence of national resolution frameworks” and should “help
strengthen cross-border crisis management” regarding these systemically
important firms, particularly large banks or financial institutions. 154 In
order to adequately protect the global economy from the failure of these
G-SIFIs or large financial institutions, countries are being asked to
amend their national regulations to allow for increased global
cooperativeness. Although reform has been primarily concerned with
global financial institutions, the disorderly failure of a multinational
manufacturing company, like our hypothetical GCP, could be just as
problematic for maintaining stability in the global marketplace. With
hundreds of thousands of employees relying on GCP for income, and
suppliers and creditors relying on contracts with GCP, the collapse of
GCP could have a rippling effect throughout the world’s economies.
Widespread cooperation concerning G-SIFIs can provide the precedent
for aligning diverse national bankruptcy systems and easing the historical
friction in coordinating transnational insolvency cases.
Attention to transatlantic reform within cross-border insolvencies
continues to grow and a number of other international institutions—
notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—
are interested in reform of bankruptcy laws, both domestic and
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international.155 The World Bank has asserted the important benefit to
market economies of an insolvency framework that is predictable:
The creation . . . of a framework [for an insolvency
system], and its integration within the wider context of
the established legal process, are vital to the maintenance
of social order and stability in the fullest sense: all
parties in interest need to be in a position to anticipate
their legal rights in the event of the debtor’s inability to
pay, or to pay in full, whatever is due to them in
consequence of their dealings and relationship. This in
turn enables them to make calculations regarding the
economic implications of such default by the debtor, and
hence to estimate risk.156
The IMF, in recognizing the world needs a new way of handling debt
crisis, has entertained the option of creating bankruptcy “procedures on
the international level that are similar to those that exist on the domestic
level.” 157 In this regard, the IMF would limit itself to the debt crises
faced by countries in economic trouble, and would act as “a sort of
bankruptcy court.” 158 While this proposal has sparked renewed
discussion in an international forum for resolving bankruptcy disputes,
the feasibility of this IMF proposal is challenged by limited resources
and legal barriers. 159 “Regardless, the IMF and World Bank play an
important role in the convergence of bankruptcy law by requiring
bankruptcy reform in developing countries as a condition of loan
support.”160
Although there is increased transnational dialogue regarding broad
financial reform and coordinated regulation, reforming cross-border
bankruptcy laws may be more difficult to address because of the
complexity of aligning differing national bankruptcy laws. Despite
progress in international cooperation in some regulatory matters, like
foreign securities law, countries may not see the benefit in changes in
national bankruptcy systems that allow for cooperation. The hope is that
with increased dialogue and collaboration within some regulatory
frameworks, the discussion for more coordination in transnational
insolvency cases can be broached. The best approach to cooperation may
be through the insolvency protocol agreement on a case-level basis.
155
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V. A COOPERATIVE SOLUTION

A uniform global bankruptcy law, while entertained in academic
discussions, is likely unfeasible. For the reasons discussed earlier
countries have unique cultural, legal, and political systems in which they
operate and transact, and those long-standing histories evolve only
slowly and with corresponding baggage. In response to globalization, the
best option for future cooperation most likely exists on the case-level
insolvency protocol agreements. However, the case-level insolvency
protocol needs to be supported by a strong over-arching international
agreement between jurisdictions that would provide consistent guidance
and precedent to protect debtors and creditors alike when transacting
business. Predictability can be hard to come by in an inherently chaotic
system like insolvency, and an advantage of having more universal rules
could be increased predictability and therefore, stability.161
The problems of the case-by-case protocol, like that used in Lehman,
stem from a lack of authoritative weight to enforce the principles of the
protocol. The international bankruptcy regime could use an IOSCO-like
agreement, as mentioned supra in IV, that would help bind signatories to
comply with case protocols for international insolvency proceedings,
providing a legal context for this previously economic solution. This type
of Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU) would require
a considerable amount of groundwork as countries would need to adapt
their domestic laws to allow them to comply with an international
agreement. While revolution is well underway thanks to the UNICTRAL
Model Law, further revision is necessary. The agreement would govern
the development and implementation of a protocol for a specific crossborder case and would provide better clarity and structure in defining the
players and roles of jurisdictions involved. The Foreign Main Proceeding
would be an easier determination with objective criteria to ascertain the
primary jurisdiction, and through this agreement, countries would pledge
to support the main proceeding by whatever means necessary, within the
limits of their domestic law.
Although a widespread cooperative arrangement for insolvency
would not be without its challenges, it could still be an important tool in
managing cross-border bankruptcy cases. It is still unlikely that all
jurisdictions would sign on to an agreement like this because of the
cultural, political, and legal differences between countries. Ideally,
however, enough countries would sign the agreement to make the
principles of the agreement a standard practice in insolvency proceedings
around the world and carry some authoritative weight. Using GCP as an
example, if all the countries in which GCP had operations, suppliers, and
creditors were signatories to the agreement, GCP would use the
principles of the agreement to determine where the main proceeding
should be filed. The agreement could contain an objective formula for
161

50

See Wessels et al., supra note 12, at 51.

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 9

determining the primary jurisdiction; that is, a calculation based on
where a majority of operating costs are incurred or where a majority of
credit is obtained. After the main proceeding was finalized, the court in
that primary jurisdiction would have the ability to request assistance,
through the agreement, from other jurisdictions to consolidate assets and
claims in the primary jurisdiction. The benefit of this solution for more
streamlined cross-border insolvency proceedings, however, would be
compromised if one of the jurisdictions GCP had operations in, like
Brazil, did not sign the agreement and instead made a determination by
its local laws that the main proceeding should be in Brazil. Hopefully the
relatively widespread adoption of the IOSCO MMOU would bode well
for similar adoption of an agreement in the insolvency context.
VI. CONCLUSION
Critical issues of predictability in business interactions that depend on
transparency in applicable foreign regulations remain at the crossroads of
insolvency law and private international law.162 As long as these issues
remained unresolved by the current international insolvency scheme,
there will be uncertainty and potential instability in the global market
place. As a company like GCP highlights, most corporations interact in
multiple jurisdictions and can be so integral to some marketplaces that a
disorderly failure or collapse of the corporation could be catastrophic to a
local or even regional economy. Compounding that inherent risk of
failure and impact on the world economy, transactional costs also
increase for globalized companies. If creditors are unsure as to how their
claims would be resolved should GCP find itself unable to pay or pay in
full its liabilities, GCP’s cost of doing business may increase (which
could be passed on to consumers). In any insolvency, whether contained
in a single jurisdiction or spanning multiple jurisdictions, the interests of
the debtor, the creditor, and the legal environment or community in
which they transact must be balanced. Insolvency law is so “intimately
linked to the commercial, financial and social fabric of a state that
finding this balance is inherently challenging.”163 With an agreement in
place that establishes the guidelines for jurisdictions interacting and
managing a multi-jurisdiction resolution, this balance could be met. As
long as the economies of the world continue to interact at historic levels
and corporations find themselves intricately interwoven in the world
without regard to geographic borders, international insolvency reform in
the form of cooperative efforts will be the key in maintaining future
global financial stability.

162
163

See Mason, supra note 20, at 59.
For more on the competing interests in an insolvency case see Mason, supra note 20, at 59.

51

